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NATURE OF THE PETITION
The above court filed its decision on June 4, 1976. Pursuant to rule
76(e) and within the time allowed, formal petition for rehearing has been
filed with this court. The points relied upon there are the same as appearing in this brief. The appellant prays this court to entertain its petition
for rehearing, and to reverse the trial court with a new opinion that reflects the case law apposite.
POINTS OF ERROR
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF OR THE BURDEN
OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE ON APPELLANT.

The bottom three lines of the first page of the decision state:
"It seems that the appellant did not need an interpretation of
a contract. What he actually wanted the court to do was to
determine which of the copies of the contract correctly reflected the true agreement of the parties."
Said language incorrectly characterizes the pleadings and the record.

At

no time did appellant ask a court to determine "which" contract reflected
the agreement.

It pleaded the escrow instrument.

Paragraph III on page 3

of the instrument made the escrow instrument the sole source of authority;
all documents not escrowed are thus immaterial.

Respondents admitted said

instrument of execution, verification and escrowing.

It then pleaded an

affirmative defense of alteration, not stating the fraud to be before or
after execution.
In approaching the question, reference had better be made to Exhibit
10 which was an affirmative act of the Youngs, declaring a default on a
contract on which Hartman had already paid near $80,000.00-

Also the

court would want to consider who, in the situation at bar, was the "prime
mover".

The action of plaintiff Hartman was "defensive", if attention is

given to the prime authority cited at the bottom of page 276 of vol. 9,
Utah Code Anno. 1953 under a text of "Burden of proof in action under declaratory judgment acts, 109 ALR 1099."
The court says above "the appellant did not need an interpretation
of a contract."

What did appellant need?

In truth the opinion is wrong

in saying Hartman wanted the court to determine which of the copies of
the contract correctly reflected the true agreement of the parties.

The

complaint refers but to the escrow copy, asking the court to "instruct all
parties in the premises."
It was the Youngs who introduced the concept of another copy of the
contract, this as an affirmative defense.

The consequence of this pleading

was never understood nor conjured with by the trial court nor the appeal
court.

A proper understanding thereof would produce a different result

in the case.

A failure to grasp the import of such affirmative defense

altered the burden of proof.

This court has incorrectly stated the law in writing:
"If he (Hartman) relies upon the declaratory judgment
statute he certainly has the burden of convincing
the trial court that his claim to relief is as he
claimed it to be."
In the first place, Hartman alleged the escrow copy.

The Youngs

admitted they executed same and that it was the escrow copy.
became the true actors

Then they

in asserting the wrongful alteration of the es-

crow document, just as they had been the prime movers in sending the default notice.
In the second place, the honorable court is wrong and outside the case
law in placing the burden of proof on plaintiff Hartman.

The decision

herein is bottomed on the finding above quoted which puts the burden on
appellant Hartman.

As written, the distinction between prime burden of

proof, and going forward with the evidence, after a prima facie case has
been made, is unimportant.

We are well aware of the difference.

The

court's writing may be ambiguous, but it's import is clear here, and is
not musunderstood by appellant, nor will it be to the editors who print
and comment.

The indexes in the law books will cite the instant decision

for the proposition that the Utah high court places the burden of proof
on the person bringing a declaratory judgment action.
case law.

The court cites no

There is an abundance of case law to the contrary.

Had the

court adverted to the said case law, the decision would have noted the
vast majority of courts in the nation take a different view, and the decision would articulate the determination of this court to disagree.
We thank the court for its kind words in the final paragraph of our
unfortunate decision:

"Apparently he (Hartman) made a prima facie showing sufficient in accordance with the statute to admit the
document ..."
The court decision fails to note as a concomitant

to the above finding

that the trial court denied the Young's motion to dismiss or for non-suit
at the conclusion of plaintiff's case. (Tr 122)

By this court's allowing

that plaintiff met the burden of the statute quoted (78-25-17 UCA) the
case law of the highest authority places the burden of going forward with
the evidence on the "prime mover", the actor, the party pleading and undertaking to establish an affirmative defense.

This means the respondents

had the burden, once the prima facie case was made by appellant.
The prime authority leading to an understanding of the case law for
measuring the case at bar is that cited at said volume 9 at page 276 at
the bottomyof the Utah statute.

The annotation of 109 ALR 1099 follows

the leading case of TRAVELERS' INSURANCE v 6REEN0U6H, 190 A. 129, 109
ALR 1096, 1937.

If this court desires to disagree with said case, may it

say so. The thrust of Greenough is that the mere bringing of the declaratory judgment action does not determine burden of proof.

It discusses

"preliminary issues," which should be disposed of ahead of a principal
action, stating the declaratory judgment procedure to be admirable.

It

talks about a plaintiff that in truth has been put on the "defensive" in
a demand by the insured to defend a negligence suit.

If the driver of

the insured car had been a trespasser or someone for whom consent had not
been given, the insurred owed no duty to defend.

The New Hampshire court

wrote that to place the burden of proof on the "defensive" plaintiff who
filed the declarative petition for the "preliminary" determination of an
ambiguous situation, was reversible error.

The sending of Exhibit 10 by the Youngs to plaintiff Hartman put the
plaintiff "on the defensive" just as the demand to defend the insurancenegligence case did the insurrer.
Now please advert to the three final lines on the first page of the
instant decision of this court:

their ring is hollow, shallow.

In no

way do they put the compass on plaintiff's dilemma, after receiving Exhibit 10.

Plaintiff had three alternatives:

so demanded/

2)

1) pay the Youngs the $4171.00

do nothing, and let the 60-day notice run; then run the

risks stated in the default clauses of the contract which among other
things embraced a retaking of the farm without legal action;

3)

follow

the procedure outlined by the New Hampshire court as an act of good faith,
preliminarily taking the heat off by depositing the fund in court.
Paragraph III on page 3 of the contract told the plaintiff to check
the escrow document at the bank.

Thereby the other two copies, exhibits

2 and 3 are irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent.
counsel go to the bank.

Now plaintiff and his

The articulation in the opinion that "The escrow

agent allowed the appellant to take his copy of the contract" is unworthy.
(There is not the slightest hint in the evidence that the document was
touched at any time after execution and acknowledgment except by authorized
bank personnel !)
In terms of the disposition of this case at the trial and appeal level,
the plaintiff would have done better to take the risks of number two above.
The consideration of doing nothing, but waiting for the Youngs to actually
effect the default procedures, will point up the error in the decision:
Had Hartman done nothing, the Youngs would have acted either by moving
back onto the farm (with guns), or entering suit for eviction, unlawful
detainer or the like.

Had such been done, then who would this court find

had the burden of proof?

On a correct answer to this question hangs the

proper disposal of the case at bar.
have fallen on the Youngs.

There can be no question; it would

This question of law is clearly discussed in

TRAVELERS INSURANCE v GREENOUGH, 190 A 129, 109 ALR 196 (cited at pages
22, 25, 27 of our main brief) where the appeal court stated:
"Whatever the form of the proceeding and notwithstanding
its nominal position as a plaintiff, the real situation
is that it is defending against a claim of its liability.
The relief it seeks is primarily to have the claim adjudicated. Its position that the claim is without merit
is necessary, in order to show the claim is a controverted one. By instituting the litigation it compels
the claimant to take action in assertion of his claim.
He (the insured claimant) is required to establish it
to entitle it to valadity...the claim is defeated if it
is not proved, and it is for the claimant to furnish
the proof." ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )
The New Hampshire court stated that to hold a contrary view "would place
the plaintiff in a position of undue disadvantage."

Appellant in the case

at bar has been placed by this court, as well as the trial court, in the
same disadvantaged position.

The naked statement in the opinion of this

court that the burden was on appellant is wrong, contrary to the case law
of the country.

Said Travelers v. Greenough has become the law of the land!

The next strong burden of proof case under declaratory judgment
procedure, in discussing the issue,is PREFERRED ACCIDENT INS. v. GRASSO,
186 F2d 987;
brief.

23 ALR 2d 1234, cited and discussed at page 24 of our original

The 2nd CCA case is there fully discussed.

Sufficient to quote here:

"Does the fact that this is the insurer's action for a
declaratory judgment change the principle? It would
seem rather anamalous that so important a matter
should depend on the chance of who first sues and the
outstanding authority in the field argues against
such a result. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments..."

where that familiar authority argues "that the burden of proof in declaratory judgment actions rests, in the vast majority of cases, on
the moving party."
person."

He assigns this burden to "the insured or injured

The 2nd CCA held the burden was not on the plaintiff insurance

carrier, but on the insured and the injured party.
are cited as authority for the decision:

Two important cases

Travelers Ins. v Greenough,

supra, and RELIANCE LIFE v BURGESS, 8 Cir 112 F2d 234, certiorari denied
311 US 699 etc. (cited at pages 25, and two other places in our original
brief.

Borchard has been quoted at length by this court in GRAY v DEFA

153 P2d 544 and elsewhere.
Following said Grasso case is a 34 page annotation under the heading:
"BURDEN OF PROOF IN ACTIONS UNDER GENERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTS,"
There is no evidence in the text of the decision at bar that the court
adverted to said annotation, nor that appearing after the above Greenough
citation.

It is doubtful this court has plumbed the law stated in the

second paragraph on page two of its

decision.

The cases are so well

analyzed in the said annotation, we will not elaborate.
therein are cited in our brief.

Many cases cited

At page 1252 of the annotation it is

stated:
"There is no one principle or set of principles that
governs the incidence of burden of proof in all cases.
It is merely a question of policy and fairness based on
experience in the different situations."
The Utah court has adopted a "policy" as stated at line 8 of page 2 of
its decision which is not elaborated in terms familiar to its own decisions
and those of other states.

The decision lacks fairness.

It is a denial

of constitutional due process of law.

There is no Utah authority stating

the rule announced in the case at bar.

The court should be impressed with

the vast cerebration employed on the subject around the nation and not

reflected in its decision.

Appellant tried to find the law of the case.

Unfortunately it cited 46 cases, all in point, only to find the court
cited not one.

It will be found appellant disclosed pertinent case law

to the many problems incident to the case at bar.

We desire not to

repeat.
It is disheartening to cite cases when the writer has a conviction
they are not read, adverted to.
NATL. BANK v FORD,

Wyo

Our neighboring court wrote in FIRST
, 216 P 691, 31 ALR 1441

"The burden of proof is upon the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue."
This was an alteration case where the bank offered a note for $450 for
collection which the defendant admitted signing, but for only $150, the
instrument being raised by an unlawful alteration.

While the change was

not obvious on its face, the law is ably discussed.

Appellant is lost

when the courlB ignore its attempt to find the case law.

The above case

is one of the better discussions on the subject of alteration, burden of
, proof.
The court said the factual issues were in conflict.

Burden of proof

is one of the sole means of the court in dealing with such conflicts, so
held in PREFERRED ACCIDENT INS. CO. v GRASSO, supra in the following:
"As the first district judge found the evidence conflicting and unsatisfactory and finally settled it
through the medium of the burden of proof ..."
A lawful assessment of such burden would and will produce a different result in this case, and bring justice and rationality out into the light.
Appellant has never been so fortunate as to have the court say NORTHCREST v WALKER BANK 122 U 268, 248 P2d 692 was important to the disposition
of this case.

The trial and appeal courts have ignored its citation.

It

is believed Exhibit 1, the escrow document as it lay in the bank, was of
equal stature to a recorded deed or contract.

Northcrest and its peers

stand for a sound doctrine of he who assails a regularly verified document
must do so with clear and convincing evidence.

The wrong here is that

the assailant had no evidence; and by the application of the false imposition of burden of proof was able to prevail only on the basis of
inference, inuendo,

and the seemy theory that as the document in escrow

was taken from the vault two times by the escrow officer, there might
have been a chance for the forgery by appellant.
It should have been applied to the case at bar.
employ Northcrest.

Northcrest is good law.
There is still time to

When its splendid doctrine is brought to bear the un-

fair inferences will take their

low place, exposed for what they are.

The instant decision states:

"If he relies upon the declaratory

judgment statute, he certainly has the burden of convincing the trial
court that his claim to relief is as he claims it to be." A careful study
of the complaint and answer will show that everything appellant claimed was admitted by respondents.

Plaintiff "claimed" Exhibit 1 was duly

executed, verified and filed in the escrow.

Plaintiff "claimed" nothing

for any other document, for under paragraph III on page 3 all other documents outside the escrow are immaterial.

How the court could be so sure

of its burden-of-proof conclusion as to use the underlined "certainly"
is ambiguous to say the least.

It is not the law.

The case will be over-

ruled by some subsequent court.
In the final paragraph of the decison the court concludes the trier,
by admitting the escrow document is not required to "accept the document
as genuine."

By overruling defendants' motion for nonsuit, and by this

court's finding a prima facie case was made by plaintiff, the escrow document must stand; let he who assails now prove the fraud, the forgery it
claimed.

In the face of the disputed evidence, and in terms of the

great weight of authority that the burden is on the party asserting the
wrong or unlawful alteration or any fundamental affirmative defense,
this court should hold the Youngs must prove their claim with clear and
convincing evidence.
outset.

Plaintiff was put in an impossible position at the

This court has compounded a grave injustice, and this without

evidence, and against the great weight of law.
The trial court erred initially in putting the burden on plaintiff.
Thus plaintiff had to go forward.

Under 78-25-17 and good case law, it

was plaintiff's duty to "explain" and "account for" the alteration complained of.

Of necessity exhibits 2 and 3 came to the court; but when

the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, at the conclusion of
plaintiff's prima facie case, the dignity of exhibits 2 and 3 lowered,
according to the text of page III, paragraph 3.
The escrow document being sufficiently explained, took to the high
ground of a verified, recorded conveyance.

The California court in ROAD-

SIDE REST v LANKERSHIM 173 P2d 554 is not easy to sweep under the rug.
It will enlighten if light is desired, along with a dozen other strong
cases cited in our original brief.

This court should rehear and alter

its decision.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN CREATING ITS OWN CONTRACT, AND DISREGARDING
THE CONTRACT AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES, AND ESCROWED.

The opinion as written violates this court's ruling in such cases
as EPHRAIM THEATRE v HAWK, 321 P2d 221.

The effect of the lower court's

decision, affirmed here, makes a new and different contract than the parties

agreed to at the bank.

Why is there no reference to paragraph III of page

3 wherein the bank is to hold "all documents appurtenant to or used in connection with this agreement..."?
Exhibit 3, not Exhibit 1.

The decision turns on and validates

The decision says the three exhibits are ident-

ical except for the contested change at line 21 at page 2.
true.

Let this court state which exhibit is controlling.

certificate numbers are complete on Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 3.

This is not
The water stock

They are totally absent in

The land without the water is useless!

On page 3 blanks were

left open relating to buyer paying assessments after a date to befilledin.
Exhibit 1 was filled in 14 lines from the top.

Exhibit 3 is as blank as

the day it was typed.
The court has violated its own rules, as quoted at page 48 of the
original brief in EPHRAIM THEATRE v HAWK, 321 P2d 221.

Since when does

this court modify firm agreements to suit their own whim?

Has this court

abandoned its time-honored holding in MOODY v SMITH 9 Utah 2d 139, 340
P2d 83:

"Plaintiff cannot seek to alter a portion of a valid written

contract ... It would defeat the yery purpose of formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the use of words ... inconsistent with its terms to
prove that the parties did not mean what they said."

Exhibit 1 has been

abandoned; Exhibit 3 is raised to appurtenance, and it is an incomplete
instrument.

Such result is a "reformation", neyer pleaded nor contended

for at the trial.
was not pleaded.

This court has held reformation must be pleaded!
It became an afterthought by the court, along with

"mistake" also not pleaded nor proven.

It

Exhibit 1 was the prime document the parties agreed would control.
There was a deliberation applied to it, absent in the other two which
not f u l l y conformed!
were c o l l a t e r a l , / k e p t but for reference. Yet the unconformed Exhibit 3
has risen to the prime expression of the parties.
of Exhibit 3 would produce poor results.

Specific enforcement

Yet has not this court, as well

as the court below substituted the incomplete Exhibit 3 for the escrow
instrument?

If this is what the court intends, let is so state so the

editors of American Law Reports, American Jurisprudence and the rest may
know where this court stands.
III.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE ARE NO INITIALS BY THE
ALTERATION.

The decision states "There are no initials by the changed numeral..."
The case could make some worthwhile law, helpful to jurisprudence if this
court would allow that there are initials within from three to five lines
of the alteration in question.

Let this court illuminate this true issue.

As it is, the decision is a fog.

We have searched the cases and find nothing

worth citing on such placement of initials juxtaposed to an alteration.
Admittedly it is a "tough", hard decision to find the parties intended
the initials at lines 24 and 25 were intended to reach to line 21.

Burden

of proof, as assigned to the asserting the affirmative that the change was
in truth a forgery, and the initials were not intended to reach such change,
is a convenient way courts solve such problems.

A court of equity in an

equity case has the power to employ conscience.

Conscience came off second

best to inference, at both levels.

IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING "THE ESCROW AGENT ALLOWED
APPELLENT TO TAKE HIS COPY OF THE CONTRACT".

The decision states "The escrow agent allowed the appellant to take
his copy of the contract on more than one occasion ... he had access to
the document, and the opportunity to change it."
words.

Appellant resents these

They represent prejudice and are capricious for there is no evidence

the appellant or his counsel even touched Exhibit 1.

When this united court

will allow such language and the inferences incident thereto, there is no
chance to pursuade on other critical issues.

The whole case of respondents

was built on such thin inferences when under doctrines continuously announced by this court, the accusers should have produced evidence, clear
and convincing.

In NORTHCREST v WALKER BANK cited at page 45 of our brief

it is repeated:
It is true that such acknowledgment and recordation give
rise to a presumption of the genuiness and the due execution
and delivery of the deed and is prima facie evidence thereof.
This presumption should not be regarded lightly but should be
given great weight. The authorites generally hold that the
effect of such certificate of acknowledgment will not be overthrown upon a mere preponderence of the evidence, but it must
be clear and convincing.
If this court does not care to apply such law to the facts of a verified,
escrowed contract of large money involvement, let it so state, please.

CONCLUSION
This appeal court compounded the errors of the trial court.

In

terms of rule 76 (e) petition is made for a rehearing for the reasons
stated herein.

Reference is made to appellant's original brief, and

particularly to points II, III and IV and to the cases cited.
relates to the evidence.

Point one

It being conflicting the problems may be solved

by a proper application to burden of proof being assigned to the respondents
for they were the prime movers from the default letter to the effort to
establish their affirmative defense.
should still be reversed.

In this they failed.

The trial court

The money on deposit awarded to appellant.
Respectfully,
»

_^

Warwick C. Lamoreaux, attorney for appellant.

This is to certify that on the

18

day of June 1976, the under-

signed mailed two copies of the within APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING,
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